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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Most members were outraged when their colleagues stood on the 
floor of the United States House of Representatives to support an act 
that would repeal the Boy Scouts of America’s (BSA) congressional 
charter.1 Eleven weeks earlier the BSA had won a landmark victory 
before the Supreme Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,2 which 
arguably recognized a constitutional right to discriminate against 
homosexuals. Proponents of the repeal measure wanted Congress to 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2002; B.S., Economics & History, 
Florida State University, 1999. I would like to thank Professor Steven Bank for suggesting 
this topic and for his invaluable contribution to this effort as both mentor and critic. 
Thanks to my classmates for their input during our Tax Policy Seminar and to Dr. Randall 
Holcombe for sharing his expertise. I appreciate the efforts of Chasity Frey and the Law 
Review staff in preparing this Comment for publication. Most importantly, I thank my 
wife, Courtney, for her love, support, and friendship.   
 1. 146 CONG. REC. H7448, 7450 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Wool-
sey) (advocating the repeal of the BSA’s federal charter). 
 2. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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send its own message to the BSA, and the rest of the country, that 
such discrimination was unacceptable.  
 In Dale, an openly gay scout leader challenged his termination 
and the BSA’s underlying policy of discriminating against homosex-
ual scout leaders.3 The challenge was brought primarily under a New 
Jersey public accommodations statute, which prohibited discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.4 
The New Jersey trial court rejected Dale’s complaint, finding that the 
BSA was not a place of public accommodation.5 The court also held 
that Dale’s forced inclusion in the BSA would violate that organiza-
tion’s First Amendment right to freedom of expressive association.6 
After losing both appeals in New Jersey, the BSA appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court.7 
 Prominent organizations and advocate groups joined forces with 
the litigants, involved in what one commentator described as a “mi-
crocosm of the cultural war.”8 Somewhat ironically, a prominent gay 
rights organization backed the BSA.9 The case was the legal manifes-
tation of de Tocqueville’s “conflicting passions”:10 Dale demanded 
governmental protection from discrimination, while the BSA re-
sponded by asserting its freedom of association. Of course, the Court 
could only satisfy one “passion” at the expense of the other. Regard-
less of the outcome, it was clear that the repercussions of the decision 
would be profound.11 
 The core of the BSA’s argument was that the New Jersey statute 
infringed upon its freedom of expressive association.12 The Court 
                                                                                                                    
 3. Id. at 645. For relevant background information on James Dale, see Dale v. Boy 
Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1204-05 (N.J. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000). 
 4. Dale, 530 U.S. at 645. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 646. 
 7. Id. at 646-47. 
 8. Joe Loconte, The Boy Scouts’ Day in Court: The Supreme Court Hears a High 
Stakes Case over Gay Scoutmasters, Will Freedom of Association Prevail?, THE WKLY. 
STANDARD, Apr. 24, 2000, at 30, 31 (noting that the BSA was supported by such groups as 
the Mormon Church and the U.S. Catholic Conference, while Dale was backed by the 
American Civil Liberties Union and the National Organization for Women). 
 9. George F. Will, The Boy Scouts’ Unlikely Friends, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2000, at 
B7 (reporting that Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty filed an amicus brief on behalf 
of the BSA). 
 10. What de Tocqueville described as “conflicting passions” are two basic desires: the 
desire to be led and the desire to remain free. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 338 (Henry Reeve trans., Arlington House 1966) (1835). In our context, Dale’s 
anti-discrimination claim may be considered as the former, while the BSA’s freedom of as-
sociation defense more logically identifies with the latter. 
 11. Loconte, supra note 8, at 35 (quoting Professor Robert George who, in contemplat-
ing the ramifications of a Dale victory, predicted that associational freedom would ulti-
mately be extinguished; that, “[i]n the name of freedom [courts] will wipe out freedom”). 
 12. Dale, 530 U.S. at 646. 
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agreed, holding that the New Jersey statute violated the BSA’s first 
amendment right to associate.13 It stated that, in pursuing its goals 
and beliefs, the BSA has the constitutional right to discriminate 
based on sexual preference in determining and implementing the 
standards for its scout leaders.14 Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist accepted the BSA’s assertion that it did not want to 
promote homosexual conduct, concluding “[w]e need not inquire fur-
ther.”15 Justice Souter’s dissent echoed Roberts,16 insisting that the 
majority’s treatment of the case afforded too much deference to the 
BSA’s own characterization of its expressive purpose. To be satisfied 
with the organization’s own appraisal of its mission, he continued, 
“would convert the right of expressive association into an easy trump 
of any antidiscrimination law.”17  
 Dale immediately attracted a great deal of national,18 and even in-
ternational,19 attention to the BSA and its discriminatory policy. The 
decision has been subjected to the exhaustive scrutiny of legal com-
mentators,20 with many of them criticizing various aspects of the 
opinion and the result it reached.21 Some of them, including Justice 
                                                                                                                    
 13. Id. at 647-48 (reiterating the rule articulated in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984), that the right to associate necessarily includes the right to not 
associate). 
 14. Id. at 656. 
 15. Id. at 651. 
 16. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28 (rejecting the Jaycees’ contention that the admis-
sion of women would compromise its expressive purpose). 
 17. Dale, 530 U.S. at 701-02 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 18. See, e.g., Excerpts From the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Gays and the Boy Scouts, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A28 (providing portions of the opinion); Edward Walsh & 
Hanna Rosin, Court Says Boy Scouts Can Expel Gay Leader, WASH. POST, June 29, 2000, 
at A1 (briefly discussing the decision and its possible implications); Roger Wilkins, Edito-
rial, The Court’s Term Is Over, but Not the Discord, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2000, at A24 
(criticizing the decision). 
 19. David Usborne, Setback for Gay Movement as Court Rules Against Sacked Scout-
master, THE INDEP. (London), June 29, 2000, at 14, available at LEXIS, News Library, Ma-
jor Newspaper File (writing that “[t]he gay movement in the United States suffered a set-
back” with the Court’s ruling) (on file with author). 
 20. See generally David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 121 
(2001); John C. O’Quinn, Recent Developments, “How Solemn is the Duty of the Mighty 
Chief”: Mediating the Conflict of Rights in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 
(2000), 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319 (2000); Elizabeth A. Powers, Comment, Constitu-
tional Law: The Freedom of Expressive Association, an Organization’s Right to Choose 
What Not to Say: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000), 53 U. FLA. L. REV. 
399 (2001); John Fonte, Why There is a Culture War, Gramsci and Tocqueville in America, 
POL’Y REV., Dec. 1, 2000, at 15 (characterizing the reasoning in Dale as quintessentially 
Tocquevillian). 
 21. Taylor Flynn, Don’t Ask Us to Explain Ourselves, Don’t Tell Us What to Do: The 
Boy Scouts’ Exclusion of Gay Members and the Necessity of Independent Judicial Review, 
12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 87-88 (2001) (contending that Dale weakens the Court’s abil-
ity to uphold state anti-discrimination laws); Scott Fruehwald, Pragmatic Textualism and 
the Limits of Statutory Interpretation: Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 35 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 973, 1020-26 (2000) (claiming that the majority improperly utilized purposivism, 
rather than pragmatic textualism, in construing the New Jersey statute); Darren Lenard 
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Stevens, claim the Court was too easy on the BSA.22 Moreover, 
criticism was not confined to law review articles; Dale also sparked 
opposition from those in the media and the general public who dis-
agreed with the BSA’s policy. Many considered the decision to be an 
endorsement from the Court of the BSA’s policy.23 There is even an 
organization primarily devoted to ending that policy.24  
 While the decision brought the BSA and its anti-gay policy to the 
headlines, criticism of the policy existed prior to Dale.25 But the deci-
sion has certainly fueled the fire, leading some critics26 to question 
whether it is appropriate for the BSA to continue to profit from the 
                                                                                                                    
Hutchinson, “Closet Case”: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Reinforcement of Gay, 
Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 81, 87-88 (2001) (express-
ing concern that Dale ignored important considerations of gay and lesbian identity issues 
that may contribute to “the silencing of sexually oppressed classes”); N. Nicole Endejann, 
Note, Coming Out is a Free Pass Out: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 34 AKRON L. REV. 
893, 899-908 (2001) (arguing that the Court gave too much deference to the BSA’s claim 
that homosexuality was against its expressive purpose); Michael T. Osborne, Note, Erect-
ing Prejudice into Legal Principle: Boy Scouts of America v. James Dale, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 
515, 516-17 (2000) (criticizing the Court for failing to fully apply the balancing test of Rob-
erts). But see O’Quinn, supra note 20, at 339-48 (praising the reasoning of the decision 
while attacking the dissenting opinions). 
 22. Dale, 530 U.S. at 676-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (determining that the “BSA’s in-
ability to make its position clear and its failure to connect its alleged policy to its expres-
sive activities is highly significant”); Endejann, supra note 21, at 899-908; Erica L. 
Stringer, Note, Has the Supreme Court Created a Constitutional Shield for Private Dis-
crimination Against Homosexuals? A Look at the Future Ramifications of Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (2001) (arguing that the balancing test of 
Roberts was improperly abbreviated by the Dale Court). 
 23. See, e.g., Todd Camp, Scouts’ Honor?, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 29, 2001, 
at 1 (criticizing the BSA’s discriminatory policy as “violating its own standards”). 
 24. An organization called “Scouting for All” has been established with the purpose of 
ending the BSA’s discrimination against homosexuals. It also advocates for gay rights in 
other areas as well. The organization can be located at http://www.scoutingforall.org (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2002) (on file with author), where it posts various information related to its 
cause. The site provides news and recent events related to the BSA. 
 25. Rick Cendo, Commentary, Scouts’ Honor?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 1998, at N12 (stat-
ing that the BSA “market[s] themselves as a public service to all boys” but they “appear to 
think that part of their public service is to teach boys by example that it’s good to shun and 
exclude those who have a different sexual orientation”); Robert V. Ritter, Editorial, The 
Boy Scout Ban, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1993, at A24. But see Timothy P. Smith, Editorial, Is 
Political Correctness Worth Cost to Youth?, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Sept. 25, 2000, at 17A 
(scoutmaster relating that the BSA is overwhelmingly a very positive influence in its 
scouts’ lives). 
 26. See generally David A. Brennen, Tax Expenditures, Social Justice, and Civil 
Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 
BYU L. REV. 167 (arguing that tax exemptions should be granted and revoked in order to 
further social policy); Russell J. Upton, Comment, Bob Jonesing Baden-Powell: Fighting 
the Boy Scouts of America’s Discriminatory Practices by Revoking Its State-Level Tax-
Exempt Status, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 793 (2001) (contending that the revocation of the BSA’s 
exemption is the proper course of action for combating its controversial policy towards ho-
mosexuals). Another method that has been suggested to discourage the BSA’s policy is the 
revocation of its monopoly status, which exists via federal charter. See Larry A. Taylor, 
How Your Tax Dollars Support the Boy Scouts of America, THE HUMANIST, Sept. 19, 1995, 
at 6. 
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various government benefits it receives.27 In fact, not long after Dale 
was handed down, Congress was debating whether to repeal the 
BSA’s federal charter, although the proposal was overwhelmingly re-
jected.28 Other critics, perhaps mindful of nonprofit organizations’ pe-
culiar unaccountability,29 have concluded that the organization’s fed-
eral tax exemption should be completely revoked, just as Bob Jones 
University’s exemption was revoked for the school’s engaging in ra-
cial discrimination.30 The common feeling among these critics, in 
                                                                                                                    
 27. See Brennen, supra note 26, at 169-70 (relating that “despite calls for an end to 
tax benefits,” the Boy Scouts will retain its favorable tax treatment); Upton, supra note 26, 
at 820-21 (stating that, by providing tax exemption, the government is “not only condoning, 
but also, effectively funding the organization’s anti-gay policy”). This Comment uses tax-
exempt status, tax exemption, and § 501(c)(3) interchangeably unless otherwise indicated. 
 28. The legislation was defeated in the House by a vote of 362-12. Apparently it was 
merely intended to send a message to the BSA that its long-held charter was not infallible. 
146 CONG. REC. H7448, 7450 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Woolsey). See 
also House Backs Boy Scouts in Vote 0ver Gay Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at A21 
(reporting the failed proposal). For commentary prior to the House vote, see Carolyn Loch-
head, Bill to Sanction Boy Scouts Faces Likely Defeat Today: North Bay Lawmaker Wants 
to Punish Group for Barring Gay Leaders, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 13, 2000, at A3 
(relating that the proposal faced considerable opposition); Editorial, No Honor for Intoler-
ance, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 7, 2000, at A22 (supporting proposal to repeal the BSA 
charter); Charley Reese, Editorial, Take Scouts Charter? Madness, ORLANDO SENT., Sept. 
7, 2000, at A10 (blasting Democrats proposing repeal of BSA’s charter as having “gone 
mad”). 
 29. For a discussion of the accountability of nonprofit organizations, see RANDALL G. 
HOLCOMBE, WRITING OFF IDEAS: TAXATION, FOUNDATIONS, AND PHILANTHROPY IN 
AMERICA 171-95 (2000). Another commentator related that the nonprofit sector is “inhab-
ited by a congeries of tribes who acknowledged fealty to neither Caesar nor the Invisible 
Hand, who were accountable in neither the arena of politics nor the marketplace of eco-
nomics.” Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 503 
(1990). As a practical matter, nonprofit organizations are usually given only cursory review 
when applying for exemption, and they are rarely audited once it has been granted. See 
Rebecca Carr, IRS is Too Lax in Screening Nonprofit Groups, Critics Say, ATLANTA J. 
CONST., Oct. 24, 2000, at A4 (reporting criticism of the quality of IRS oversight of exempt 
organizations).  
 30. See Upton, supra note 26, at 803-04 (recognizing that revoking the BSA’s federal 
exemption will require the involvement of the Court or Congress, but suggesting that revo-
cation can be achieved more easily at the state level); Cendo, supra note 25, at N12 (ques-
tioning whether the BSA truly provides a public service that justifies a tax subsidy); Ritter, 
supra note 25, at A24 (concluding that “it is time for Congress and the states to revoke the 
tax-exempt status of the [BSA] and other discriminatory private nonprofit organizations”); 
Taylor, supra note 26, at 7 (asking rhetorically whether the BSA can “have it both ways,” 
by being private for the sake of discrimination but public for the sake of eligibility for tax-
payer support). But see Patrick J. Reilly, Editorial, The Boy Scout Ban, WASH. POST, Jan. 
10, 1994, at A14 (writing to say that revoking the BSA’s tax exemption “is not the logical 
reaction that Robert V. Ritter would lead us to believe,” and that “while tax-exemption is 
not a right for any group, specifically targeting organizations with unpopular beliefs 
amounts to tyranny”); Smith, supra note 25, at 17A (scoutmaster arguing that the many 
positive aspects of the BSA should not suffer because of one unpopular policy). The Su-
preme Court, in upholding the revocation of a University’s exemption in Bob Jones Univer-
sity v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1983), stated that to qualify for exemption un-
der § 501(c)(3), a charitable organization cannot be engaged in activity that is illegal or 
contrary to fundamental public policy. 
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light of the outcome in Dale, is that the unpopular policy is best ad-
dressed through the tax code.31 
 But is this a reasonable proposition? Should we take away an or-
ganization’s exemption because it has an unpopular policy? The idea 
that we should revoke the tax exemption of one of the oldest charita-
ble organizations in the country is certainly a startling proposal that 
deserves attention, but not because the proposal is practical. Admit-
tedly, proponents of revocation represent a very small minority, and 
the BSA is not in any real danger of losing its exemption. Rather, the 
proposal deserves attention because it raises fundamental issues un-
derlying the tax exemption policy. The proposal provides a context in 
which to explore policy options that are available for dealing with 
another Bob Jones.  
 On the one hand, we could decide, as many have, that the Internal 
Revenue Service should duplicate Bob Jones by simply revoking the 
BSA’s tax exemption. However, that course of action would squander 
the chance to consider the policy alternatives that were not available 
to the Court when it decided Bob Jones. It would squander the oppor-
tunity to weigh policy considerations that the Court is neither em-
powered nor generally inclined to entertain. After all, the earliest 
criticism of the Bob Jones decision was that the Court wrongly de-
cided a policy question that is reserved to the representative 
branches of government.32 
 Resisting the gravitational pull towards Bob Jones in order to ar-
rive at a novel approach for the BSA can help recapture the tax pol-
icy-making power from the Court. It affords policymakers the chance 
to do what their predecessors perhaps should have done almost 
twenty years ago: set the policy themselves rather than allowing the 
Court to do it for them. In short, the prospect of revoking the BSA’s 
exemption presents the setting for an intriguing tax policy exercise. 
 The argument that the BSA’s exemption should be revoked can be 
separated into three major components. First, that tax exemption 
should be contingent upon the organization’s purpose being consis-
tent with some notion of fundamental public policy, which is what 
the Supreme Court determined in Bob Jones.33 Second, that dis-
crimination against homosexuals is contrary to fundamental public 
policy34 and therefore, under Bob Jones, warrants revocation of the 
                                                                                                                    
 31. See supra notes 26-27. 
 32. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 33. See id. at 585-86 (holding that to qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3), a chari-
table organization cannot be engaged in activity that is illegal or contrary to fundamental 
public policy); Upton, supra note 26, at 835-36. 
 34. 146 CONG. REC. H7448, 7448 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2000) (“A policy of excluding ho-
mosexuals is contradictory to the Federal Government’s support for diversity and tolerance 
and should not be condoned as patriotic, charitable, or educational.”). But see Upton, supra 
note 26, at 835-36 (recognizing that there is currently no federal policy against discrimina-
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BSA’s exemption. Finally, that the revocation of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)35 
status is the best course of action from a tax policy perspective when 
dealing with an activity that is contrary to public policy, particularly 
in the context of the BSA.36 This Comment addresses the tax policy 
considerations involved in the context of the BSA in light of Bob 
Jones. As this is exclusively a tax policy exercise, the other compo-
nents are assumed arguendo to exist, and only the last point is ad-
dressed in this Comment. 
 The purpose of this Comment is to identify a better way to use tax 
policy in response to the BSA’s discriminatory policy, while consider-
ing the Bob Jones precedent, without running afoul of the tax policy 
reasons for granting exemption in the first place. The principle objec-
tion to outright revocation of the BSA’s exemption is that it would 
fail to account for the underlying rationales for the exemption. The 
proposal rushes to invoke Bob Jones without contemplating interme-
diate solutions that may address the public policy issue while also 
preserving the integrity of the tax exemption provision. For purposes 
of this argument, this Comment makes two major assumptions:37 
first, that discrimination against homosexuals is contrary to funda-
mental public policy; and second, that tax policy is an appropriate 
vehicle for effectuating policy goals. 
 Proponents of revoking the BSA’s exemption are pointing to the 
wrong place. Assuming that discrimination against homosexuals is 
contrary to fundamental public policy, warranting revocation under 
Bob Jones, the proper place for a change in tax status is the BSA’s 
charitable contribution deduction rather than the exemption of the 
organization itself. The charitable contribution deduction is provided 
as a federal subsidy to encourage contributions to worthy causes and 
may properly be revoked for policy reasons.38  
                                                                                                                    
tion based on sexual orientation, but noting that such a policy exists in twelve states and 
the District of Columbia). This point is clearly the weakest of the three, but it is far from 
inconceivable that this may not be the case in the near future. This Comment does not in-
tend to express a viewpoint on this issue. Instead, the objective of this Comment is to as-
sess the tax policy considerations that are presented under the hypothetical scenario that 
discrimination against homosexuals is against fundamental public policy. 
 35. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).  
 36. See Brennen, supra note 26, at 170 (asserting that the tax exemption is a good 
way to achieve social policy goals); Upton, supra note 26, at 805 (claiming that the combi-
nation of the additional financial burden, the “stigma” of revocation, and the “backlash” 
from supporters may bring about a change in the BSA’s discriminatory policy). 
 37. Implicit in the assumption that discrimination against homosexuals violates fun-
damental public policy is the additional assumption that the BSA’s policy would not pass 
the Bob Jones test. The analysis and conclusions in this Comment are based on the as-
sumption that the BSA would face the same fate as Bob Jones University and therefore at-
tempts to avoid that result while addressing the unsatisfactory condition of the BSA’s cur-
rent tax status. 
 38. See infra notes 110-119 (discussing charitable contribution deduction rationale) 
and accompanying text. 
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 The exemption, on the other hand, represents the recognition that 
nonprofits like the BSA do not realize taxable income.39 Revoking its 
exemption on policy grounds is inconsistent with the reason for 
granting the exemption in the first place and therefore the total 
revocation of the BSA’s exemption is unacceptable from a tax policy 
standpoint. As an alternative to total revocation, this Comment sug-
gests that the BSA’s charitable contribution deduction may be elimi-
nated by converting the BSA to a § 501(c)(4) organization.40 This so-
lution would be consistent with tax policy theory as well as the public 
policy requirement imposed upon charitable organizations by Bob 
Jones. 
II.   BACKGROUND ON TAX EXEMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.   Legal History of Charity 
 The basic notion of a charity can be traced at least as far back as 
1362.41 The legal history of charity extends to 1601, the year in which 
the English Statute of Charitable Uses was enacted.42 This Statute 
enumerated several causes deemed to be charitable, such as: “‘relief 
of aged, impotent and poor people . . . maintenance of sick and 
maimed soldiers and mariners’ . . . and the ‘aid and help of . . . per-
sons decayed.’”43  
 The implementation of the Statute by the English common law 
over the centuries had a great influence on what was considered 
“charitable.”44 Shortly before the American Revolution, the English 
Court of Chancery established the public benefit principle, which 
states that “a trust, in order to be charitable, must be of a public 
character; that is, it must be for the benefit of the community or an 
appreciably important section of the community.”45 In 1891, Lord 
McNaughten articulated that “[c]harity in its legal sense comprises 
four principle divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the 
advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; 
and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling 
                                                                                                                    
 39. See infra notes 92-103 (discussing exemption rationale) and accompanying text. 
 40. This Comment is not advocating any change in the BSA’s tax status. It merely of-
fers an intermediate solution as a sound policy alternative to total revocation. 
 41. Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Chari-
table Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 U. FLA. L. REV. 419, 425 (1998) 
(citing a poem written in 1362 that chronicles the means by which more fortunate citizens 
may give back to their community). 
 42. Id. at 425-26. 
 43. Id. (quoting JOHN P. PERSONS ET AL., CRITERIA FOR EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 
501(C)(3), RESEARCH PAPER SPONSORED BY COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUBLIC 
NEEDS (U.S. Dept. of Treasury 1977) at 1912-13).  
 44. See id. at 426. 
 45. SPENCER G. MAURICE & DAVID B. PARKER, TUDOR ON CHARITIES 4 (7th ed. 1984). 
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under any of the preceding head[ings].”46 These principles remained 
prominent in English law and were ultimately inherited by American 
jurisprudence. They served as a foundation upon which the American 
law on charities was built.47 
 The exemption of charities from income tax has been the practice 
in this country as long as there has been a federal income tax.48 The 
charitable contribution deduction has been allowed since 1917.49 Af-
ter the Revolution, the United States began to develop its own law on 
charity,50 which manifested itself in the tax exemption provisions of 
the first corporate income tax law, passed in 1894.51 The language of 
the Tariff Act of 1894 included the basic elements of the current ver-
sion of § 501(c)(3). It exempted “corporations, companies, or associa-
tions organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious or edu-
cational purposes.”52 The Tariff Act of 1909 added the requirement 
that net income earned by such exempted organizations could not 
“inure[] to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual.”53  
 There were a number of minor amendments over the years that 
enumerated additional types of eligible charitable organizations or 
otherwise amended the scope of eligibility, eventually arriving in 
1954 at the current version of § 501(c)(3).54 Although there have been 
                                                                                                                    
 46. Crimm, supra note 41, at 426. 
 47. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 589 (1983) (acknowledging that 
Pemsel “has long been recognized as a leading authority in this country”); id. at 590 n.16 
(stating that the “common-law requirement of public benefit is universally recognized”). 
 48. Id. at 615-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (tracing the legislative history of § 
501(c)(3)). See also Crimm, supra note 41, at 427 (stating that the first federal corporate 
income tax, which was adopted in 1894, provided for an exemption for certain charitable 
organizations); Herman T. Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 
44 A.B.A. J. 525, 525-26 (1958) (stating that the original exemption from federal income 
taxation was in 1894); Tommy F. Thompson, The Unadministrability of the Federal Chari-
table Tax Exemption: Causes, Effects and Remedies, 5 VA. TAX REV. 1, 8 (1985) (noting that 
the charitable exemption originated in 1894). 
 49. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 309, 344 (1972). 
 50. Crimm, supra note 41, at 427. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 615 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing the Tariff Act of 
1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894)). 
 53. Id. at 616 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 113 (1909)). 
 54. The Tariff Act of 1913 (exempting scientific organizations); The Revenue Act of 
1918 (exempting organizations that promote the prevention of cruelty to children and ani-
mals); The Revenue Act of 1921 (exempting literary endeavors and adding the “community 
chest, fund, or foundation” language); The Revenue Act of 1934 (prohibiting exempt or-
ganizations from engaging in propaganda and lobbying); The Revenue Act of 1954 (exempt-
ing organizations that conduct testing for public safety). See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 615-16 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The current version of § 501(c)(3) follows: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and op-
erated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, lit-
erary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of ath-
letic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or ani-
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several changes, the core language in § 501(c)(3) is similar to the 
original exemption provision enacted over a hundred years ago.55 
B.   Role of Nonprofit Organizations 
 In his famous reflection on American life, Alexis de Tocqueville 
observed: 
If it be proposed to advance some truth, or to foster some feeling by 
the encouragement of a great example, they form a society. Wher-
ever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the Govern-
ment in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States 
you will be sure to find an association.56 
As de Tocqueville related, nonprofit organizations have always been 
very important and highly valued in the United States.57 Nonprofit 
organizations existed in England long before they appeared in the 
New World, but their place in English society was never as funda-
mental as it has become in the United States.58 De Tocqueville at-
tributed this difference to a fundamental disparity between aristo-
cratic and democratic society.59 Commenting on the American transi-
tion to democracy from the old aristocratic order, he recognized that 
a society’s population that loses “the power of achieving great things 
single-handed, without acquiring the means of producing them by 
united exertions, would soon relapse into barbarism.”60 
 Not long after Democracy in America was published, John Stuart 
Mill professed that nonprofit organizations were desirable from a so-
cietal standpoint based on a theory of pluralism, and he further em-
phasized the role of government in advancing their causes.61 He ob-
served that: 
                                                                                                                    
mals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carry-
ing on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as 
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or inter-
vene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
 55. Compare Crimm, supra note 41, with sources cited, supra note 54 and accompany-
ing text. 
 56. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 10, at 114. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 115 (noting generally that in England “the principle of association was by no 
means so constantly or so adroitly used”). 
 59. Id. at 115-16 (noting that in an aristocracy there are a small number of very pow-
erful members of society with control over the majority of the population; whereas in a de-
mocracy, “citizens are independent and feeble” and therefore require the ability to associ-
ate). 
 60. Id.  
 61. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THREE ESSAYS 135 (1912).  
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Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With indi-
viduals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are var-
ied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. What the 
State can usefully do, is to make itself a central depository, and ac-
tive circulator and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many 
trials. Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by 
the experiments of others; instead of tolerating no experiments but 
its own.62 
The idea of pluralism was also discussed in Green v. Connally,63 in 
which the court described pluralism “as a prime social benefit of gen-
eral significance.”64 It noted that the advantage of “decentralized 
choice-making” is that it is “more efficient and responsive to public 
needs than the cumbersome and less flexible allocation process of 
government.”65 The Dale Court apparently subscribed to the rather 
convincing logic that “[a] society in which each and every organiza-
tion must be equally diverse is a society which has destroyed diver-
sity.”66 
 However, recent arguments concerning the importance of non-
profit organizations have focused on economic theory rather than 
pluralism. Professor Henry Hansmann authored the seminal work in 
the area, in which he articulates his contract failure theory67 and dis-
cusses various reasons why the nonprofit sector is superior to the for-
profit sector in some cases.68 Others have come to the same conclu-
sion in specific industries.69  
 Hansmann’s contract failure theory states that profit-seeking 
firms will choose not to supply certain goods and services even 
                                                                                                                    
 62. Id.  
 63. 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.D.C. 1971). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Brief for Petitioners at 19-20, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 
99-699). 
 67. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 844-45 
(1980) (arguing that the contract mechanism that exists in the for-profit sector fails to pro-
vide adequate incentive and protection to support the provision of goods and services that 
are provided by the nonprofit sector). 
 68. Id. at 846-49 (explaining the “nondistribution constraint” inherent in nonprofit 
organizations, the higher amount of trust that results from the inability to distribute prof-
its, and the general notion of the “free rider” problem with public goods being reasons why 
the nonprofit sector is better suited for providing certain goods and services); id. at 845 
(noting that the absence of shareholders in nonprofit organizations constitutes a major dif-
ference in structure and incentives between the nonprofit and for-profit enterprise). See 
also HOLCOMBE, supra note 29, at 197-214. 
 69. See, e.g., James T.Y. Yang, Collaboration Between Nonprofit Universities and 
Commercial Enterprises: The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Universities from Federal 
Income Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 1857, 1874-76 (1986) (arguing that nonprofit organizations 
are better than government in the area of research universities, and noting that nonprofits 
are free of bureaucracy and therefore more efficient and responsive to ideas and change). 
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though there is some demand for them.70 This is particularly appar-
ent in areas where conventional market forces—supply and de-
mand—are distorted, as in the case of “public goods.”71 Where gov-
ernment fails to do so, nonprofits are particularly well-suited to pro-
vide public goods, such as national defense, which are unattractive or 
impractical in the for-profit sector.72 The failure of government to 
provide certain public goods completes the so-called twin-failure the-
ory, which “describes nonprofit [organizations] as a response to social 
and economic challenges beyond the capabilities of for-profit firms on 
the one hand and government on the other.”73 
 Hansmann’s market failure theory implies that the role of non-
profits is confined only to areas in which such a failure exists.74 But 
such confinement may be neither necessary nor appropriate.75 Per-
haps the role of nonprofit organizations extends beyond the realm of 
(for-profit) market failure, and even intrudes to some extent on the 
traditional stomping grounds of the market economy.76  
 The critical difference between the contract failure and market 
failure theories is that market failure theory assumes that nonprofit 
goods and services are indistinguishable from those provided by for-
profit firms.77 Others reject this assumption, arguing that nonprofit 
organizations provide something different than their for-profit coun-
terparts: nonprofit organizations do not simply provide goods and 
services, they provide the altruistic supply of goods and services.78 
While there is disagreement over the scope of the role of nonprofit 
                                                                                                                    
 70. Hansmann, supra note 67, at 843-45. 
 71. Id. at 843-48.  
 72. See Id., supra note 29, at 201-08. National defense has two characteristics com-
mon to goods and services that are more appropriately provided by the public or non-profit 
sector: joint consumption and nonexcludability. Id. at 202-03. National defense is con-
sumed by one person without detracting from consumption by fellow users. Id. Also, na-
tional defense is nonexcludable in that it is difficult or impossible to prevent individuals 
from consuming the good or service, i.e., it would be exceedingly difficult to adequately pro-
tect certain citizens while not affording the same protection to their neighbors. Id. 
 73. See Id., supra note 29, at 206-08; Atkinson, supra note 29, at 505; Mark A. Hall & 
John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1379, 1391 (1991). 
 74. Hansmann, supra note 67, at 844-45. 
 75. See Atkinson, supra note 29, at 510. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Hansmann, supra note 67, at 844-45. Beyond his general discussion of the topic, 
Hansmann called attention to different types of nonprofit organizations. “Donative” non-
profits are those that receive most of their income or funding from grants and donations. 
“Commercial” nonprofits are those that raise most or all of their income or funding from 
prices charged for goods and services. Examples of commercial nonprofits include most 
hospitals, the American Automobile Association, and nursing homes. As is the case with 
most attempts at categorization, many nonprofit organizations are somewhere between the 
two categories, deriving a significant portion of their revenues from donations and the sale 
of goods and services. See id. at 840-41. 
 78. Atkinson, supra note 29, at 510. This theory represents the essence of Professor 
Atkinson’s altruism rationale for exempting charitable organizations from income taxation. 
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organizations, it is generally acknowledged that the nonprofit sector 
serves a critical role alongside the for-profit and public sectors in the 
United States. 
III.   FROM NONPROFIT TO TAX EXEMPTION (UNDER § 501(C)(3)) 
 The discussion of exemption under § 501(c)(3) concerns more than 
exemption; an equally important benefit afforded by § 501(c)(3) is the 
charitable contribution deduction. Although (c)(3) organizations re-
ceive both, the two benefits are distinct. And while the reason for 
granting the exemption and charitable contribution deduction is of-
ten considered to be the same, the rationales underlying the two 
benefits are not identical. The difference between these rationales 
reveals why the argument for outright revocation of the BSA’s ex-
emption is unsatisfying from a tax policy standpoint, and it suggests 
an alternative tax policy in the BSA situation that is consistent with 
tax policy theory. 
A.   Principle Rationale for Exemption 
 Several different theories attempt to explain the rationale for the 
tax exemption of charitable organizations. The subsidy rationale has 
been the prominent explanation, and it is usually the one cited by 
courts.79 Other scholars have offered capital formation, altruism, or 
donative rationales.80 However, this Comment contends that the best 
rationale for the exemption, put forth to refute the subsidy rationale, 
is the income definition rationale offered by Professors Bittker and 
Rahdert.81  
1.   Subsidy Rationale 
 The Supreme Court has stated that exemption “is intended to en-
courage the provision of services that are deemed socially benefi-
cial.”82 It is also “intended to aid” charitable organizations that pro-
vide some public benefit.83 Tax exemption is based on the notion that 
government is relieved of a portion of its public burden by the activi-
                                                                                                                    
 79. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590 (1983) (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 75-1860, at 19 (3d Sess. 1938)). 
 80. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from 
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981); Atkinson, supra note 29; Hall & Co-
lombo, supra note 73. Professor Nina Crimm has suggested a “Risk Compensation” theory, 
but this explanation seems to be a variation of the “Subsidy” theory and therefore it has 
not been recognized as an independent rationale. See Crimm, supra note 41. 
 81. See Boris J. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organiza-
tions from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). 
 82. Portland Golf Club v. Comm’r, 497 U.S. 154, 161 (1990). 
 83. Trinidad v. Sagrada, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (adding that considering the new 
language, a tax subsidy is only appropriate when the activity is “not conducted for private 
gain”). 
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ties and services of charitable organizations and should therefore fa-
cilitate those private activities by providing a tax exemption.84  
 Charitable organizations provide goods and services that would 
otherwise have to be supplied by the government;85 in other words, 
they provide a public service or benefit.86 The notion is that instead of 
demanding taxes from charitable organizations that provide a public 
service or benefit, the government should compensate these private 
organizations in the form of a tax break.87 In this way, the amount of 
taxes that would otherwise be paid by charitable organizations 
represents an indirect subsidy from the government. The exemption 
is designed to facilitate or encourage exempt activities by relieving 
some of the costs otherwise associated with such activities.88 
 However, in Walz v. Tax Commissioner,89 the Court disapproved of 
advancing this rationale too far, stating that exemption should not be 
likened too closely to a government subsidy.90 Rather than viewing 
the exemption as a form of government support, the Court stated 
that the government “simply abstains from demanding that the [or-
ganization] support the state.”91 Furthermore, Justice Brennan 
added that tax exemptions and subsidies are “qualitatively differ-
ent.”92 The Walz Court seemed to be pulling in the reigns on the sub-
sidy rationale by emphasizing the distinction between exemption and 
direct government support, suggesting that there is a more satisfying 
explanation for the exemption. 
2.   Income Definition Rationale 
 Professors Bittker and Rahdert offer the income definition ration-
ale as an alternative to the subsidy rationale.93 They conclude that 
the subsidy rationale is inadequate as a complete rationale for tax 
exemption.94 Bittker and Rahdert argue that the subsidy rationale 
does not provide an affirmative reason for exempting charitable or-
ganizations instead of having government provide their services; in-
                                                                                                                    
 84. See Portland Golf Club, 497 U.S. at 161; Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 590; Trinidad, 
263 U.S. at 581; Duffy v. Birmingham, 190 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1951). 
 85. See Hansmann, supra note 80, at 66-67. 
 86. Trinidad, 263 U.S. at 581 (public benefit); Duffy, 190 F.2d at 740 (public service). 
 87. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 590; see also Hansmann, supra note 80, at 66-67. 
 88. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 9-11 (7th ed. 
1998) (enumerating six rationales for the tax exemption under § 501(c)(3), the last three of 
which could be categorized under the subsidy rationale). 
 89. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 90. Id. at 675 (dealing with tax exemption within the context of the Establishment 
Clause). 
 91. Id. (alteration in original) (determining that exemption does not constitute gov-
ernment sponsorship of churches in violation of the Establishment Clause). 
 92. Id. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 93. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 81. 
 94. Id. at 332-33. 
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instead it merely illustrates that exemption and government funding 
are equivalent and interchangeable.95 They argue that the subsidy 
rationale does not assert any justification for a preference between 
an exemption and government funding or a reason why one is supe-
rior to the other.96 The income definition rationale proposes that the 
real reason for the exemption of charitable organizations involves the 
problem or inability of defining taxable income for charitable organi-
zations.97 Essentially, the income definition rationale contends that 
charitable organizations are exempt because they do not have “in-
come” under the Code.98  
 The trouble with taxing charitable organizations is reflected in 
two dilemmas. First, should a charitable organization be taxed as an 
entity or, alternatively, be allowed to pass its income through to its 
beneficiaries (much like a partnership)?99 Under the income defini-
tion rationale, charitable organizations cannot be taxed at the entity 
level because there is no accession to wealth; it is all passed along to 
its beneficiaries or the public, or reinvested.100 Even if charitable or-
ganizations can be taxed as entities, IRS guidelines for business ex-
penditure deductions apply unfavorably to charitable organiza-
tions.101 The exemption exists, therefore, because the earnings of 
charitable organizations cannot be considered income in the usual 
sense under the Code.102  
 The second reason for the exemption under this rationale is that, 
even if there is definable taxable income, there are no methods for 
determining a suitable tax rate.103 Neither the “ability to pay” con-
cept nor the “net income” rationale for income taxation apply very 
well to charitable organizations.”104 
3.   Other Rationales 
 As a result of dissatisfaction with the rationale offered by Bittker 
and Rahdert, Professor Hansmann has proposed that the proper ra-
tionale for charitable organizations’ tax exemption is that “it helps to 
compensate for the constraints on capital formation that nonprofits 
                                                                                                                    
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 307-14. 
 98. Id. at 305.  
 99. Id. at 309-11. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 310 (stating that the IRS does not allow deductions for “expenditures not 
motivated by the desire for profit”). 
 102. Id. at 305, 309-11. 
 103. Id. at 314-16. 
 104. Id. at 333. 
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commonly face.”105 Hansmann contends that, because nonprofit or-
ganizations are less attractive to traditional investors, the tax ex-
emption offsets this disadvantage with the ability to retain a greater 
portion of its earnings.106 
 Professor Atkinson states that government should subsidize these 
organizations because charitable organizations are altruistic and 
provide something to society that is desirable.107 Atkinson argues 
that the exemption represents an “affirmative preference” for what 
the organization is doing.108 The altruism rationale rejects the mar-
ket failure as it applies to tax exemptions.  
 The market failure rationale asserts that nonprofits should only 
receive an exemption where there is a failure in the market—when 
the for-profit sector fails to satisfy the demand for a good or ser-
vice.109 However, rather than merely filling in the gap left by the for-
profit sector, the altruism rationale argues that charitable organiza-
tions should be granted an exemption for everything they do, includ-
ing providing goods and services that are also provided by for-profit 
firms.110 Under the altruism rationale, charitable organizations do 
not provide identical goods and services like the for-profit sector; the 
altruistic nature of nonprofits is what distinguishes the two.111 
B.   Rationales for the Charitable Contribution Deduction  
(Under § 170(c)) 
1.   Subsidy Rationale 
 The Supreme Court has stated that the charitable contribution 
deduction is “a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax 
system.”112 A charitable contribution deduction is a subsidy to chari-
table giving, which indirectly constitutes a subsidy to charitable or-
ganizations.113 Much like the rationale for an exemption, the reason-
ing underlying the charitable contribution deduction has been that 
government is relieved of some part of its public burden by charitable 
organizations—that which would otherwise “fall on the shoulders of 
                                                                                                                    
 105. See Hansmann, supra note 80, at 55. Professor Hansmann offers his theory in re-
sponse to the theory put forth by Professors Bittker and Rahdert. His own contribution is 
premised on the rejection of Bittker and Rahdert’s conclusion that charitable organizations 
do not realize “income.” See id. at 58-62; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 81, at 305. 
 106. Hansmann, supra note 80, at 56. 
 107. Atkinson, supra note 29, at 618. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 510; Hansmann, supra note 67, at 844-45. 
 110. Atkinson, supra note 29, at 510. 
 111. Id. at 509-10. 
 112. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
 113. Andrews, supra note 49, at 344. 
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the [g]overnment”—and the government should compensate for that 
relief with favorable tax treatment.114  
 The Court has recognized that favorable tax treatment is “in-
tended to aid” charitable organizations that provide some public 
benefit.115 Therefore, where the government is relieved of a responsi-
bility, it provides favorable tax treatment to those organizations that 
provide the relief.116 The provision for the charitable contribution de-
duction has been extended in order to subsidize these contribu-
tions.117 The deduction has also been recognized as an effective way 
to support charitable giving.118 
 The Treasury Secretary once stated that the charitable contribu-
tion deduction is an appropriate way to encourage charitable organi-
zations.119 Professor Bittker describes the deduction as “rewards for 
praiseworthy behavior.”120 Whether it is characterized as encourage-
ment or reward, people seem to agree that the compelling reason for 
the deduction is to support or subsidize charitable contributions and 
the organizations that receive them. 
2.   Income Defining Rationale 
 The income defining rationale has been offered in this area to 
suggest that contributions made to charitable organizations are not 
to be considered “consumption” by the contributor and, therefore, are 
not included in taxable income.121 Professor Andrews argues that the 
provision for the charitable contribution deduction, as well as other 
types of deductions, is attributable to a refinement of the notion of 
income rather than a departure from it.122 Andrews labels the distin-
guishing factor between taxable personal consumption and nontax-
able charitable contribution as that of “preclu[sive] enjoyment”: the 
former involves private, non-divisible goods or services that preclude 
                                                                                                                    
 114. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972). See also Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590 (1983); Hansmann, supra note 80, at 66-67. 
 115. Trinidad v. Sagrada, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (considering new language added in 
the exemption provision by the Tariff Act of 1909, the Court added that a tax subsidy is 
only appropriate when the activity is “not conducted for private gain”). 
 116. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 590; see also Hansmann, supra note 80, at 66-67. 
 117. See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contri-
butions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 657, 661 (2001) (stating that the deduction under § 170(c) is an indirect 
subsidy to charitable organizations). 
 118. See McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 456; DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, PROPOSALS 
FOR TAX CHANGE 75 (1973) [hereinafter PROPOSALS]. 
 119. PROPOSALS, supra note 118, at 75. Secretary George P. Shultz stated that “exist-
ing deductions for charitable gifts and bequests are an appropriate way to encourage 
[charitable] institutions.” Id. 
 120. Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 
28 TAX L. REV. 37, 60-61 (1972). 
 121. Andrews, supra note 49, at 313-15. 
 122. Id. at 312-13. 
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others from consuming that good or service, while the latter is collec-
tive and does not preclude others.123  
 Andrews states that the reason for the charitable contribution de-
duction is that charitable contribution is not really personal con-
sumption, but rather it is for “common goods whose enjoyment is not 
confined to contributors nor apportioned among contributors accord-
ing to the amounts of their contributions.”124 Yet, while this argu-
ment has been generally accepted as a sound theory for charitable 
contribution deductions, even Andrews has conceded that the promi-
nent explanation for the deduction is that it is a subsidy to charitable 
giving.125 Therefore, this Comment proceeds on the basis that the 
subsidy rationale is the primary rationale for the charitable contribu-
tion deduction. 
IV.   FROM “CHARITABLE” TO EXEMPTION: THE PUBLIC POLICY 
REQUIREMENT 
 The word “charitable” has been prominent in § 501(c)(3) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code and its predecessor since the exemption provi-
sion was first enacted.126 The creation of a precise definition of “chari-
table,” however, has eluded judges, scholars, and legislators for 
years. One commentator has noted that “[i]ts definition is historically 
based but has defied precision.”127 There is very little congressional 
guidance regarding what “charitable” is supposed to mean.128 How-
ever, in a dispute challenging a private school’s exemption, the Su-
preme Court has been faced with the issue of defining the scope of 
“charitable” within the context of § 501(c)(3). 
A.   Bob Jones University v. United States129 
 In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of 
whether a private school that engaged in racial discrimination quali-
fies for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).130 In accordance with its 
religious belief, the University enforced a strict policy forbidding in-
                                                                                                                    
 123. Id. at 314-15. 
 124. Id. at 346. Andrews recognized that critics of the charitable contribution deduc-
tion disagree with this point and would argue that such contributions are no different than 
other personal expenditures that do not qualify for the deduction. See id. at 362-63. 
 125. Id. at 344. 
 126. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 615-16 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (tracing the history of the exemption provision). 
 127. Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-for-Profit 
Health Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. 
REV. 1, 39 (1995). 
 128. Id. 
 129. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 130. Id. at 577. 
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terracial dating among its students.131 No other policy was considered 
to be discriminatory.132 The Court determined that there was an im-
plicit public policy requirement in § 501(c)(3) and the University’s 
discrimination failed to satisfy that requirement, therefore rendering 
the school ineligible for tax-exempt status under that provision of the 
Code.133 
B.   The Public Policy Requirement 
 In its opinion, the Court immediately recognized both the need 
and the properness of looking beyond the language of § 501(c)(3) to 
gain insight as to the intended requirements of that provision.134 Af-
ter considering “Congressional purpose” and its effect on the IRS, the 
Court concluded that a public policy requirement existed under the 
current provision.135 The Court reasoned that, under § 501(c)(3), 
“[c]haritable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt 
entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which society or the com-
munity may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supple-
ments and advances the work of public institutions already sup-
ported by tax revenues.”136 
 The Court found that an implicit public policy requirement in the 
definition of “charitable” was not novel; it had been recognized for 
over a century.137 In Perin v. Carey, the Court held that charities 
must be “consistent with local laws and public policy.”138 Not long af-
ter Perin, the Court ruled that “[a] charitable use, where neither law 
nor public policy forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that 
tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man.”139  
 Turning its attention to more recent rulings, the Court deter-
mined that the basic common law concept of charity meant that 
charitable organizations may not be illegal or contrary to public pol-
icy.140 This meant that there were two requirements under § 
501(c)(3): first, that the organization must fit under one of the eight 
                                                                                                                    
 131. See id. at 580. 
 132. The University’s other discriminatory practices of prohibiting the admission of 
blacks, and later unmarried blacks, had been phased out by May of 1975. See id. 
 133. Id. at 595-96. 
 134. Id. at 586 (stating that “[i]t is a well-established canon of statutory construction 
that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language 
would defeat the plain purpose of the statute”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 591. 
 137. Id. at 588 (citing Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 465, 501 (1861)); Ould v. Wash. 
Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877)). 
 138. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 588. 
 139. Ould, 95 U.S. at 311 (emphasis added) (citing 2 JAIRUS WARE PERRY, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 687 (George F. Choate ed., Little, Brown, and Co. 
3d ed. 1882) (1874)). 
 140. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 579 (citing Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230). 
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categories enumerated in the provision; and second, that the organi-
zation does not act contrary to law or to settled public policy.141 The 
Court cautioned that only in cases in which “there can be no doubt 
that the activity involved is contrary to fundamental public policy” 
should exemption be revoked on these grounds.142 
 Having determined that there is a public policy requirement im-
plicit in the definition of charitable under § 501(c)(3), the Court then 
addressed the issue of whether the University’s policy satisfied that 
requirement. In light of past congressional action on the matter, the 
Court determined that “there can no longer be any doubt that racial 
discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted 
views of elementary justice”143 and, therefore, institutions practicing 
such discrimination do not qualify for tax-exempt status under § 
501(c)(3).144  
C.   Justice Rehnquist’s Dissent 
 Justice Rehnquist agreed that the University’s discriminatory pol-
icy was against public policy, but he stated that the Court is “not 
constitutionally empowered” to decide policy matters that are re-
served to Congress.145 He observed that the majority was perhaps ex-
ceeding its judicial authority by relying upon the public policy re-
quirement. He recognized that: 
With undeniable clarity, Congress has explicitly defined the re-
quirements for § 501(c)(3) status. An entity must be (1) a corpora-
tion, or community chest, fund, or foundation, (2) organized for one 
of the eight enumerated purposes, (3) operated on a nonprofit ba-
sis, and (4) free from involvement in lobbying activities and politi-
cal campaigns. Nowhere is there to be found some additional, un-
defined public policy requirement.146 
He added that only Congress possessed the power to add a public pol-
icy requirement and may readily do so if it chooses, but it had not.147 
D.   Problems with the Public Policy Requirement 
 Some commentators have echoed the observations contained in 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent. They strongly criticized the Court for 
improperly deciding a policy issue reserved to the other branches of 
                                                                                                                    
 141. Id. at 585. 
 142. Id. at 592. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 595-96; See, e.g., Bob Jones U Trounced, 8-1, WASH. POST, May 25, 1983, at 
A24. 
 145. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 613 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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government.148 They agreed with the dissent that, regardless of the 
merits, it was beyond the authority of the Court to adjudicate a pol-
icy question.149 Furthermore, employing a common law concept of 
charity in order to create a public policy requirement may be unde-
sirable from a practical standpoint. The IRS may applaud the deci-
sion to bestow broad discretion upon it (as well as the courts), but the 
ambiguity associated with the broad notion of charity would surely 
make its job more difficult.150 
V.   EXPLORING OTHER EXEMPTION PROVISIONS 
A.   I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) vs. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) 
 Up to this point, tax exemption has been treated as a general con-
cept, and the charitable contribution deduction has largely been ig-
nored.151 However, there are several different sections in the Code 
providing tax exemption other than § 501(c)(3).152 There are a myriad 
of exempt organizations that do not qualify under § 501(c)(3). In ad-
dition to the exemption afforded under § 501(c)(3), the other subsec-
tions provide an exemption to civic leagues or organizations;153 labor, 
agricultural, or horticultural organizations;154 business leagues;155 
clubs organized for pleasure or recreation;156 fraternal beneficiary so-
cieties;157 voluntary employees’ beneficiary associations;158 local 
teachers’ retirement fund associations;159 local benevolent life insur-
ance associations;160 and some cemetery companies.161 While § 
501(c)(3) provides the broadest exemption and is the primary exemp-
tion provision,162 it is by no means the only exemption provision. 
                                                                                                                    
 148. See Thomas McCoy & Neal Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of 
Tax Exemption for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 441, 464 (1984). 
See generally Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable Organizations, 3 
VA. TAX REV. 291 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court has “misread the common law 
into Code while confusing the public policy and public benefit strands of charitable trust 
law”). 
 149. See McCoy & Devins, supra note 148, at 464. 
 150. See Thompson, supra note 48, at 54. 
 151. Deductibility of contributions under I.R.C. § 170(c). 
 152. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2000). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. In 1992 it was estimated that there were 1.4 million exempt organizations in the 
United States. Of that total, 887,000 were exempt under § 501(c)(3). The other 513,000 or-
ganizations were spread out among the several other subsections of 501(c). See generally 
VIRGINIA ANN HODGKINSON ET AL., NONPROFIT ALMANAC 1992-1993: DIMENSIONS OF THE 
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 The next most prominent exemption provision appears to be § 
501(c)(4).163 That provision provides an exemption to the following 
organizations: 
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated 
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations 
of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees 
of a designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and 
the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, 
educational, or recreational purposes.164 
Both § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) provide for exemption from federal 
income taxation.165 Yet there are two principal differences between 
the two provisions. The most significant difference is that, unlike 
contributors to (c)(3) organizations, contributors to (c)(4) organiza-
tions are not permitted to deduct their contributions. However, (c)(4) 
organizations are permitted to engage in substantial lobbying activ-
ity to advance their exempt purpose while (c)(3) organizations are 
not.166 Section 501(c)(3) organizations must be “charitable,” while § 
501(c)(4) organizations are those “[c]ivic leagues or organizations” 
that are “operated exclusively for the promotion of the social wel-
fare.”167 
B.   Social Welfare Organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) 
 The most significant advantage that a social welfare organization 
(SWO) has over its (c)(3) counterpart is the ability to directly influ-
ence legislation, or “lobby.”168 Neither section permits involvement in 
                                                                                                                    
INDEPENDENT SECTOR (1992) (providing statistical information regarding charitable or-
ganizations in the United States). 
 163. In 1992 there were 143,000 social welfare organizations, with 396,000 spread out 
over the several other subsections. Id. 
 164. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2000). This provision can be traced to the Tariff Act of 1913, 
which added a new provision providing for the exemption of social welfare organizations. It 
read, in part, any “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated ex-
clusively for the promotion of social welfare.” Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 
114, 172. 
 165. See supra notes 54, 164 and accompanying text. § 501(c)(3) organizations, “(c)(3) 
organizations,” and “charitable organizations” are referred to interchangeably. § 501(c)(4) 
organizations, “(c)(4) organizations,” and “social welfare organizations” are also referred to 
interchangeably. 
 166. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 543 (1983); Bittker & 
Rahdert, supra note 81, at 345-48; Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: 
Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 239 (1987) (noting that (c)(3) or-
ganizations may engage in lobbying activities to some extent, but the permitted level is 
well below that which is permitted of (c)(4) organizations), 249-50 (conveying that the rea-
son (c)(3) organizations are not permitted to lobby is the theory that government should 
avoid underwriting participation in political debate). 
 167. See supra notes 54, 164 and accompanying text. 
 168. See HOPKINS, supra note 88, at 293; Chisolm, supra note 166, at 239.  
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elections or the campaigns of candidates for public office.169 But the 
price for the ability to lobby is substantial: the loss of the charitable 
contribution deduction under § 170(c).170 The stated reason for this 
difference in treatment is that Congress did not wish to subsidize 
lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that 
promote the public welfare.171 Stated differently, Congress considers 
lobbying worthy of exemption but has also determined that it should 
not be extended to the second tier of favorable tax treatment repre-
sented by the charitable contribution deduction.172 Hence, Congress 
has afforded SWOs engaged in substantial lobbying half of the total 
tax benefit: an exemption but no deductions for its donors. 
 The lesser amount of tax benefit seems to be offset to some extent 
by the greater freedom with which SWOs operate. Although SWOs 
share some of the same basic restrictions with (c)(3) organizations,173 
they have greater latitude in their activities.174 The IRS has recog-
nized that an organization formed to provide “for the social im-
provement and welfare of the youths of the community” is a SWO 
under § 501(c)(4).175 Of course, SWOs are not permitted to engage in 
illegal activities “which violate the minimum standards of acceptable 
conduct necessary to the preservation of an orderly society” because 
that is “not [a] permissible means of promoting social welfare.”176 
                                                                                                                    
 169. See Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexis-
tence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308 (1990) (relating that (c)(3) organizations may not engage 
in election-related activity, even via a (c)(4) arm that it controls, because (c)(4) organiza-
tions are also subject to a prohibition on election participation). 
 170. See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 546-47. 
 171. See id. at 544. 
 172. See Chisolm, supra note 166, at 237 (summarizing the Court’s description of con-
gressional intent in Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)). But see Note, IRS 
Denials of Charitable Status: A Social Welfare Organization Problem, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
508, 511-12 (1983) (arguing that there should be no distinction between the treatment of 
(c)(3) and (c)(4) organizations, so that social welfare organizations are treated as charitable 
and receive the charitable contribution deduction). 
 173. See HOPKINS, supra note 88, at 293 (noting that SWOs must not be operated pri-
marily for the economic benefit or convenience of its members); id. at 279 (noting that 
SWOs must satisfy some notion of public benefit or “civic betterment”). But see Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,694 (Jan. 21, 1988) (suggesting that (c)(3) organizations might well be jeopardized 
by election-related activities of its (c)(4) affiliate even though the affiliate is permitted to 
engage in such activities). 
 174. See HOPKINS, supra note 88, at 290 (pointing out that SWOs can actively partici-
pate in the legislative process and directly advocate for desired legislative and executive 
policies); Crimm, supra note 127, at 33 (noting that the IRS and the courts have applied 
more stringent requirements under (c)(3) than under (c)(4), but also that the standards ap-
plied under (c)(3) are clearer than those utilized with respect to (c)(4)). 
 175. See Rev. Rul. 68-118, 1968-1 C.B. 261. 
 176. See Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204. 
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C.   The Dual Structure in Regan v. Taxation with Representation177 
 In Taxation With Representation, the Court was confronted with a 
challenge to the disparate tax treatment afforded by §§ 501(c)(3) and 
(c)(4).178 In that case, Taxation With Representation of Washington 
(TWR) was a nonprofit corporation that ran two other nonprofit or-
ganizations, one of which was exempt under § 501(c)(3) and the other 
under § 501(c)(4). The (c)(3) organization published a journal and en-
gaged in litigation, while the (c)(4) organization pursued the same 
goals through lobbying.179 The issue presented in the case arose when 
TWR merged the two organizations and applied for (c)(3) status for 
the newly formed entity.180 Because the former (c)(4) branch of TWR 
continued to lobby heavily within the new entity, the IRS denied the 
application due to the prescription found in § 170(c) against substan-
tial lobbying activity by § 501(c)(3) organizations.181 
 In addition to addressing TWR’s claims,182 the Court acknowl-
edged the validity and desirability of TWR’s previous dual structure, 
under which the two distinct activities—non-lobbying and lobbying—
operated in compliance with the respective provisions of the tax 
code.183 The Court suggested that TWR revert back to its previous 
structure, delegating all of its lobbying activity to the (c)(4) affili-
ate,184 thereby indicating approval of such an arrangement.185 In his 
concurrence, Justice Blackmun went a step further, stating that the 
dual structure is necessary to avoid rendering § 501(c)(3) unconstitu-
tional.186 Blackmun characterized the § 501(c)(3) prohibition on lob-
bying activities as a “defect” that § 501(c)(4) conveniently rectifies by 
                                                                                                                    
 177. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
 178. See id. at 544. 
 179. See id. at 543. 
 180. See id. at 542. 
 181. See id.  
 182. The bulk of the opinion dealt with (and rejected) TWR’s constitutional claims and 
is not relevant to the tax policy discussion. 
 183. See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544; see also Thomas A. Troyer & 
Albert G. Lauber, Jr., Supreme Courts TWR Decision Provides Guidance in 501(c)(3) Lob-
bying, 59 J. TAX’N 66 (1983) (providing a contemporary account of the impact of Taxation 
with Representation, 461 U.S. 540). But see Chisolm, supra note 166, at 239-40 (pointing 
out the downside to the dual structure discussed in Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 
540, is that it would still need to be determined where to draw the line between (c)(3) and 
(c)(4) activities). 
 184. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544. 
 185. See id. But see generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) 
(upholding the revocation of the University’s exemption under § 501(c)(3) without even 
mentioning § 501(c)(4) or the dual structure approach, despite having just endorsed the 
dual structure approach in Taxation with Representation the day before). The major dis-
tinction is that Taxation with Representation involved lobbying, whereas there was racial 
discrimination in Bob Jones. Perhaps the Court determined there was no way to separate 
the racial policy into a (c)(4) affiliate because such discrimination pervaded the entire 
organization. 
 186. See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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allowing (c)(3) organizations to establish (c)(4) affiliates created ex-
clusively to handle lobbying efforts.187  
VI.   RECLASSIFYING THE BSA 
 The BSA currently enjoys tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) and 
likewise enjoys the charitable contribution deduction under § 170(c). 
One alternative to revoking its tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) is 
to convert it to a § 501(c)(4) organization.188 This conversion would 
change the BSA’s classification from a “charitable” organization un-
der (c)(3) to a “social welfare organization” under (c)(4).189  
 This proposal addresses the inconsistency of the BSA’s discrimi-
natory policy with Bob Jones,190 but it also stays within the parame-
ters of tax policy. It serves as a more reasonable compromise between 
the calls for total revocation of the BSA’s favorable tax treatment and 
the perhaps unpopular alternative of continuing to afford all of the 
tax benefits that the BSA currently enjoys.191 Furthermore, this pro-
posal communicates the appropriate message to the BSA regarding 
its disfavored policy while continuing to encourage the BSA with the 
subsidy provided by exemption. 
 The BSA would certainly meet the requirements of a SWO.192 The 
IRS has recognized that an organization formed to provide “for the 
social improvement and welfare of the youths of the community” is a 
SWO under § 501(c)(4).193 On the BSA’s website, it states that its 
purpose is “to provide an educational program for boys and young 
adults to build character, to train in the responsibilities of participat-
ing citizenship, and to develop personal fitness.”194 Basically, the 
                                                                                                                    
 187. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 188. This is what happened in Alexander v. Americans United, Inc., 416 U.S. 752 
(1974), in which the IRS revoked an organization’s (c)(3) status because of substantial lob-
bying activity but soon thereafter issued a letter exempting the organization as a social 
welfare organization under (c)(4). The effect was to preserve the exemption while revoking 
the charitable contribution deduction by converting the organization from (c)(3) to (c)(4). 
See Alexander, 416 U.S. at 754-55. It also meant that the organization was liable for un-
employment (FUTA) taxes under § 3301. Id. at 755. 
 189. An intermediate alternative would be to apply Justice Rehnquist’s suggestion in 
Taxation with Representation: bifurcate the BSA into (c)(3) and (c)(4) components. See 
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544. Consistent with the scenario discussed in 
Taxation with Representation, the BSA would be required to convert its scouting operation 
into a (c)(4) organization, while retaining (c)(3) status for its other operations that do not 
have the discriminatory policy, with both entities under the BSA umbrella but strictly 
separating their respective funds. 
 190. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574. 
 191. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Rev. Rul. 68-118, 1968-1 C.B. 261. 
 194. Mission Statement of the Boy Scouts of America, at 
http://www.scouting.org/nav/about.html (last visited June 12, 2002) (on file with author). 
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purpose is to instill values in young people.195 It seems certain that 
the BSA could satisfy the requirements under (c)(4), so the question 
becomes whether this proposal is compatible with the policy ration-
ales underlying the respective provisions.196 
A.   Preservation of Exemption 
 The critical objective that this proposal seeks to achieve is the 
preservation of the BSA’s exemption. Indeed, this objective is the sole 
departure from the arguments in favor of total revocation of the 
BSA’s exemption. The reason for the disparity is a disagreement over 
the reason for an exemption.  
 Those advocating the revocation of the BSA’s exemption mistak-
enly assume that exemption and the charitable contribution deduc-
tion are both primarily intended to be subsidies. Although the con-
cept of subsidy makes sense in the context of the exemption, it is un-
satisfactory as a complete explanation for it.197 Rather, the “income 
definition” rationale of Professors Bittker and Rahdert articulates 
the more compelling explanation for exemption.198 
 Under the “income definition” rationale, the argument for revok-
ing the BSA’s exemption runs afoul of the reason exemption is 
granted in the first place. Exemption is embedded in the Tax Code, 
and it should not be contingent upon some external condition such as 
public opinion.199 Revocation of the BSA’s exemption is unacceptable 
because it does not abide by that tax reality: the basis for the revoca-
tion is inconsistent with the basis for the provision of exemption. 
B.   Revocation of the Charitable Contribution Deduction 
 The primary rationale for the charitable contribution deduction is 
that government should subsidize contributions to charitable causes 
that provide a public good or benefit.200 The Supreme Court recog-
nized that the charitable contribution deduction is essentially a sub-
sidy that is provided through the tax system.201 Unlike the rationale 
                                                                                                                    
 195. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649 (2000). 
 196. It does not appear that total or partial conversion of the BSA from (c)(3) to (c)(4) 
status would infringe on the BSA’s constitutional rights. Under similar circumstances, the 
Court rejected the contention that the disparate treatment of the two sections forces the 
taxpayer to forego constitutionally protected activity. See Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983). 
 197. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 81, at 305, 307-14 (contending that nonprofit 
organizations are exempt because they do not have an “income” under the Code). 
 199. See id. 
 200. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544. 
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for an exemption,202 the reason for providing the deduction is exter-
nal to the tax code.203 
 The charitable contribution deduction is essentially a government 
subsidy, so it is the only provision that should be revoked in response 
to the BSA’s discriminatory policy. Revocation of the BSA’s charita-
ble contribution deduction, by converting it to a SWO under § 
501(c)(4), would effectuate this revocation while leaving the funda-
mental rationales of the tax provisions undisturbed. The government 
has great discretion in granting subsidies, and a logical course of ac-
tion for the government to take in response to the BSA’s discrimina-
tory policy is to remove the subsidy afforded by the Tax Code to that 
organization. However, the revocation must be confined to the sub-
sidy afforded by the charitable contribution deduction in order to be 
consistent with the underlying tax policy for the respective provi-
sions.204 
C.   The Ineffectiveness of Revocation of Tax Benefits for Achieving 
Non-Tax Goals 
 One commentator calling for the revocation of the BSA’s tax-
exempt status recognized that it would likely be ineffective at dis-
couraging or ending the BSA’s discriminatory policy.205 Indeed, by far 
the largest source of the BSA’s revenue is derived from fees and in-
vestment income, not charitable contributions.206 A change in the 
BSA’s tax status would not likely affect contributions. Public opinion 
and financial pressure are the more likely catalysts.  
 In light of the negative publicity surrounding the BSA’s policy to-
wards homosexuals and the recent ruling by the Supreme Court,207 
there are many reports suggesting that both financial and general 
support of the BSA is declining.208 The United Way, the BSA’s largest 
                                                                                                                    
 202. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text. But see Andrews, supra note 49 
(arguing that the charitable contribution deduction can be explained as a refinement of the 
notion of taxable income). 
 204. See supra notes 93-104, 111-20 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Upton, supra note 26, at 800 (claiming that, despite the unlikelihood of revo-
cation having a direct effect, the removal of the tax subsidy is still “a worthy goal in and of 
itself”). 
 206. Id. at 798-99 n.18 (noting that only 1% of BSA’s funds came from contributions 
and bequests in 1996). Id. at 798-99 (noting that, in 1996, 44% of income was derived from 
fees and 26% of income was derived from investment income). 
 207. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.  
 208. See, e.g., Sheryl McCarthy, Boy Scouts’ Victory on Gays Cuts Contribution Flow, 
NEWSDAY, July 24, 2000, at A26 (commenting that “[t]he Boy Scouts may have won their 
battle” but now they are facing a backlash from charities and politicians); Laura Parker & 
Guillermo X. Garcia, Boy Scout Troops Lose Funds, Meeting Places, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 
2000, at A1 (describing the loss of $530,000 in southeast Florida as contributing to a “dom-
ino effect”). 
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contributor, appears to be using its leverage against local BSA chap-
ters to discourage the policy,209 although, perhaps, not without cost.210 
Despite these reports, it is still unclear whether the BSA is actually 
experiencing any substantial reduction in support, financial or oth-
erwise. 
 This proposal, as well as any other measure, may prove unneces-
sary if the BSA changes its own policy211 under popular and political 
pressure,212 or if there is a change in the law. Indeed, almost fifteen 
years after the Court upheld the revocation of its tax exemption, Bob 
Jones University ended its prohibition on interracial dating largely 
due to public pressure.213  
 There are two major variables involved in this issue: the BSA’s 
anti-homosexual policy, and the public policy requirement of § 
501(c)(3) as articulated in Bob Jones.214 The elimination of either 
variable would also eliminate the need for the change proposed in 
this Comment. On the one hand, calls for revocation would presuma-
bly be silenced by a voluntary change in policy on the part of the 
BSA. On the other hand, contrary to an initial assumption of this 
Comment, Bob Jones may not affect the BSA after all.215 That would 
presumably render the proposed change moot and eliminate the 
BSA’s need to change its policy. However, it should be made clear 
                                                                                                                    
 209. See Martin Luttrell, United Way Toughens Anti-Bias Policy/Boy Scouts Facing 
Loss of Funding Because of Ban on Gays, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester), Feb. 15, 2001, 
at A1; Maria Newman, United Way to Continue Aid to Central Jersey Scouts, N.Y. TIMES, 
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 210. Gwyneth K. Shaw, United Way may Lose Donor Dr. Phillips Inc., Which has Given 
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 211. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 208, at A26 (speculating that the BSA’s policy to-
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 212. See supra notes 18-24, 208-10 and accompanying text. 
 213. Bob Jones University Drops Its Ban on Interracial Dating, NEWSDAY, Mar. 4, 
2000, at A10 (reporting that the decision to eliminate the prohibition followed a campaign 
visit to the school from George W. Bush). 
 214. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1982). 
 215. Although unlikely, it might not be far-fetched to contemplate a change of direction 
or jurisprudence by the Court if it were again confronted with the public policy/exemption 
issue faced in Bob Jones. Short of that, the public policy argument, which would be essen-
tial in any case attempting to revoke the BSA’s tax-exempt status, is certainly much 
weaker than the public policy argument used against Bob Jones University. With Chief 
Justice Rehnquist presiding over a narrow majority, one which may become larger if 
President Bush is afforded the opportunity to replace some of the more liberal justices, see 
Chris Bull, Supreme Tug-of-War, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 10, 2000, at 30 (suggesting that Jus-
tices Stevens and Ginsburg may be nearing retirement), the judicial restraint of 
Rehnquist’s dissent in Bob Jones may prevail and give even more breathing room to the 
BSA’s policy. See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 612-17. 
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that the likelihood of the former scenario occurring seems much 
greater than the latter. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 In recent years, the BSA has come under fire for its discrimina-
tory policy towards its homosexual scout leaders. Pointing to Bob 
Jones, many people favor the revocation of the BSA’s tax exemption 
in order to remove public support afforded by the tax system and 
hopefully end the discriminatory policy. However, proponents of re-
voking the BSA’s exemption are pointing to the wrong place.  
 If there should be a change, the proper place for that change is in 
the charitable contribution deduction currently afforded to BSA con-
tributors rather than the BSA’s exemption. Revoking the BSA ex-
emption would be inconsistent with the rationale for exemption, 
which is based on the fact that organizations like the BSA do not re-
alize taxable income. By contrast, the charitable contribution deduc-
tion represents a subsidy that may be granted or removed without 
jeopardizing the tax system.  
 Therefore, to address the incompatibility with Bob Jones, as well 
as protect the integrity of the tax system, this Comment suggests 
that the BSA should be converted to a social welfare organization 
under § 501(c)(4). This conversion would revoke the charitable con-
tribution deduction while preserving the BSA’s exemption pursuant 
to § 501(c)(4). This proposal preserves the benefit of exemption that 
the BSA deserves while satisfying the rationale of Bob Jones by mak-
ing the public policy requirement of § 501(c)(3) no longer applicable 
to the BSA. The conversion would address the public policy concerns 
voiced by the media and the public. Finally, it would preempt the 
BSA from suffering the same fate as Bob Jones University by remov-
ing that organization from the reach of the ambiguously restrictive 
standard to which § 501(c)(3) organizations are currently held. 
 
